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A MISSING PROOF OF THE GIBBARD-SATTERTHWAITE
THEOREM
UUGANBAATAR NINJBAT
Abstract. A short and direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem a`
la Amartya Sen’s proof of Arrow’s impossibility theorem is given.
1. Introduction
Several different approaches are used in proving social choice impossibility the-
orems, such as
• By induction (see e.g. [9], [11], [8] and [13]),
• By contradiction (see e.g. [3] and [12]),
• By the pivotal voter approach (for recent modifications, see [18], [2]),
• By other known impossibility theorems (see e.g. [5]), and
• By using computer assistance (see e.g. [14], [15]).
Among these, proofs in the style of [1] and [10] have a distinct feature to treat the
impossibility result under consideration as a self contained mathematical structure
and deduce the result from its setting without referring to an external mathematical
device; see Sen’s discussions in [6]. In Sect. 3, we give a short and direct proof for
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem ([5], [9]) using this approach.
2. The preliminaries
A denotes the set of alternatives with |A| ≥ 3 elements, and X denotes the set of
strict linear orders (i.e. complete, transitive and asymmetric binary relations) on A.
Let there be N individuals in the group I = {1, 2, ..., N}. A function f : XN → A
is called as a social choice function. A member x = (x1, ..., xN ) of X
N is called as
a profile, and its i′th component, xi, is called the individual i
′s ranking. For any
x ∈ XN and i ∈ I, let (x′i, x−i) ∈ X
N denote the profile that has x′i ∈ X in its i
′th
component instead of xi ∈ X, and otherwise the same as x ∈ X
N . When a ∈ A is
ranked above b ∈ A according to xi we write a ≻xi b.
A group of individuals G ⊆ I is decisive over a ∈ A if f(x) = a for all x ∈ XN
such that a is on the top of xi for all i ∈ G. G ⊆ I is decisive if it is decisive over
all a ∈ A. We say that f : XN → A is unanimous (UNM) if I is decisive. It is
manipulable (MNP) at x ∈ XN by i ∈ I via x′i ∈ X if f(x
′
i, x−i) ≻xi f(x). It is
strategy proof (STP) if it is not manipulable. Finally, it is dictatorial (DT) if there
is a decisive group consisting of a single individual. The following result is known
as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem:
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Theorem 2.1 ([5], [9]). f : XN → A is UNM and STP if and only if it is DT.
3. The proof
From now on we assume f : XN → A is UNM and STP, and we shall prove
three subsequent lemmas.
Lemma 3.1 (Tops only). Let x ∈ XN and a, b ∈ A be such that the top ranked
alternative in xi is in {a, b} for all i ∈ I. Then, f(x) ∈ {a, b}.
Proof. By UNM, we may assume that a, b ∈ A are distinct. Let G(a, x) = {i ∈
I : xi ranks a as the top} and G(b, x) = {j ∈ I : xj ranks b as the top}. Without
losing generality, we may assume that G(a, x) = {1, ..., k} and G(b, x) = {k +
1, ..., N} for some k ≤ N .1 Consider x′ ∈ XN such that x′i = (a ≻ b ≻ ...) for all
i ∈ G(a, x), and x′j = (b ≻ a ≻ ...) for all j ∈ G(b, x). We claim that f(x
′) ∈ {a, b}.
To see this, suppose f(x′) /∈ {a, b}. Transform x′ ∈ XN by reversing the positions
of a, b ∈ A in x′i for all i ∈ G(a, x), one at a time. Let x
i be the resulting profile after
x′1, ..., x
′
i are changed, and we set x
0 = x′. Then, f(xi) /∈ {a, b} for all i ∈ G(a, x),
since
• f(x0) /∈ {a, b}, and
• if f(xi) /∈ {a, b}, but f(xi+1) ∈ {a, b} for some i ∈ {0, ..., k − 1}, then f is
MNP at xi ∈ XN by individual i+ 1 via x′i+1.
In particular, f(xk) /∈ {a, b}, which then contradicts to UNM, and this proves our
claim.
Transform x′ ∈ XN by replacing x′i with xi for all i ∈ G(a, x), one at a time. Let
yi ∈ XN be the profile obtained after x′1, ..., x
′
i are replaced, and we set y
0 = x′.
Then, f(yi) ∈ {a, b} for all i ∈ G(a, x), since
• f(y0) ∈ {a, b}, and
• if f(yi) ∈ {a, b} then f(yi+1) ∈ {a, b} for all i ∈ {0, ..., k − 1}. To see this,
suppose for some i ∈ {0, ..., k−1}, f(yi) ∈ {a, b} but f(yi+1) /∈ {a, b}. Start
with yi+1 ∈ XN and transform everyone’s preferences across {k+ 1, ..., N}
by bringing a ∈ A to the top. Then STP ensures that social choice is never
in {a, b}, which then eventually contradicts to UNM after transforming the
individual N ′s preferences.
In particular, f(yk) ∈ {a, b}. Now transform x′ ∈ XN by replacing x′j with xj for
all j ∈ G(b, x), one at a time. Let zj ∈ XN be the profile obtained after x′k+1, ..., x
′
j
are replaced, and we set zk = x′. Then, f(zj) ∈ {a, b} for all j ∈ G(b, x), since
• f(zk) ∈ {a, b}, and
• if f(zj) ∈ {a, b} then f(zj+1) ∈ {a, b} for all j ∈ {k, ..., N − 1}. To see this
suppose for some j ∈ {k, ..., N − 1}, f(zj) ∈ {a, b} but f(zj+1) /∈ {a, b}.
Start with zj+1 ∈ XN and transform everyone’s preferences across {1, ..., k}
by bringing b ∈ A to the top. Then STP ensures that social choice is never
in {a, b}, which then eventually contradicts to UNM after transforming the
individual k′s preferences.
In particular, f(zN) ∈ {a, b}. We then claim that exactly one of the following two
statements holds true:
1The reader should check that our argument works if we instead had G(a, x) = {i1, ..., ik} and
G(b, x) = {ik+1, ..., iN}.
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(a) f(yk) = b, or
(b) f(zN) = a.
To see this, assume none of them holds true. Then, since both f(yk) and f(zN) are
in {a, b}, we have f(yk) = a and f(zN) = b. Transform yk ∈ XN back to x′ ∈ XN
by reversing the above procedure. Then STP ensures that social choice remains at
a ∈ A throughout this transformation, in particular f(x′) = a. Similarly, transform
zN ∈ XN back to x′ ∈ XN . Again, STP ensures that social choice remains at b ∈ A
throughout this transformation, in particular f(x′) = b, which is a contradiction as
we already concluded that f(x′) = a and a, b ∈ A are different alternatives. Thus,
at least one of the two statements must be true. However, with a very similar
argument one can also show that the two statements in our claim can not be true
at the same time. This proves our claim.
To complete the proof of Lemma 3.1, assume f(yk) = b and transform yk ∈
XN into x ∈ XN by changing preferences of the individuals in G(b, x) into their
preferences in x ∈ XN , one at a time. Then, STP ensures that social choice remains
at b ∈ A throughout this transformation. In particular, f(x) = b. If instead we
had f(zN) = a, then we can show that f(x) = a with a similar argument. Thus,
in either case, f(x) ∈ {a, b}. 
Lemma 3.2 (Extension). Let G ⊆ I and x ∈ XN be such that a ∈ A is ranked at
the top of xi for all i ∈ G, and at the bottom of xj for all j ∈ I \G. If f(x) = a,
then G is decisive.
Proof. As above, we may assume that G = {1, ..., k} with k ≤ N . We first show
that G is decisive over a ∈ A. Let x′ ∈ XN be such that a ∈ A is at the top of x′i for
i ∈ G. Transform x ∈ XN into x′ ∈ XN by replacing xi with x
′
i, for i = 1, 2, ..., N ,
one at a time. Let xi ∈ XN be the profile obtained after changing x1, ..., xi, and
we set x0 = x. Notice that f(xi) = a for i = 1, ..., k, since
• f(x0) = a, and
• if f(xi) = a, but f(xi+1) 6= a for some i ∈ {0, ..., k− 1}, then f is MNP by
individual i+ 1 at xi+1 via xi+1.
Notice also that f(xj) = a for j = k + 1, ..., N , since
• f(xk) = a, and
• if f(xj) = a, but f(xj+1) 6= a for some j ∈ {k, ..., N − 1}, then f is MNP
by individual j + 1 at xj via x′j+1.
We showed that f(x′) = f(xN ) = a and hence, G is decisive over a.
We next show that G is decisive over any b ∈ A \ {a}. Let y ∈ XN be a profile
where yi = (a ≻ b ≻ ...) for all i ∈ G, and yj = (c ≻ ... ≻ b) for all j ∈ I \ G,
for some c ∈ A \ {a, b}. Then, f(y) = a as G is decisive over a ∈ A. Change the
positions of a, b ∈ A in yi for i = 1, 2, ..., k, one at a time. Let y
i ∈ XN be the profile
obtained after changing y1, ..., yi, and we set y
0 = y. Notice that f(yi) ∈ {a, b} for
i = 1, ..., k, since
• f(y0) = a ∈ {a, b}, and
• if f(yi) ∈ {a, b}, but f(yi+1) /∈ {a, b} for some i ∈ {0, ..., k − 1}, then f is
MNP by individual i+ 1 at yi+1 ∈ XN via yi+1.
Then, f(yk) ∈ {a, b}, but by Lemma 3.1, f(yk) ∈ {b, c}. Thus, f(yk) = b and
we can repeat the argument above to show that G is decisive over b. Thus, G is
decisive. 
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Lemma 3.3 (Contraction). If a group G ⊆ I with |G| ≥ 2 is decisive, then it has
a proper subset which is decisive.
Proof. We may again assume that G = {1, ..., k} with k ≤ N . Let x ∈ XN be a
profile with x1 = (a ≻ ... ≻ b), and for 2 ≤ i ≤ k, xi = (b ≻ ... ≻ a), and for all
k + 1 ≤ j ≤ N , xj = (a ≻ ... ≻ b). Then, by Lemma 3.1, f(x) ∈ {a, b}. If f(x) = b
then we found {2, ..., k} ( G which is decisive by Lemma 3.2.
Assume f(x) = a and we show that {1} is decisive. Take c ∈ A \ {a, b} and let
x1 ∈ XN be the profile we obtained from x ∈ XN by changing x1 with x
′
1 = (a ≻
b ≻ ... ≻ c). Then, f(x1) = a as otherwise f is MNP by individual 1 at x1 ∈ XN via
x1. Let us start with x
1 ∈ XN and change its j′th coordinate as x′j = (c ≻ ... ≻ b)
for all j ∈ {k + 1, ..., N}, one at a time. Let xj ∈ XN be resulting profile after
xk+1, ..., xj are changed, and we set x
k = x1. Then, f(xj) = a for j = k + 1, ..., N ,
since
• f(xk) = a,
• f(xj) ∈ {a, b} for all j ∈ I \G, as otherwise individual 1 can manipulate f
at xj ∈ XN by reporting b ∈ A at the top (recall that G is decisive), and
• if f(xj) = a, but f(xj+1) 6= a for some j ∈ {k, ..., N−1}, then f(xj+1) = b,
and f is MNP by individual j + 1 at xj+1 via xj+1.
In particular, f(xN ) = a. Let y ∈ XN be as y = (x1, x
N
−1), i.e. the profile obtained
from xN ∈ XN after changing its first coordinate back to x1. Then, f(y) = a as
otherwise f is MNP at y ∈ XN by individual 1 via x′1. Start with y ∈ X
N and
for 2 ≤ i ≤ k change yi = (b ≻ ... ≻ a) as y
′
i = (c ≻ ... ≻ a), one at a time. Let
yi ∈ XN be the profile obtained after changing y2, ..., yi, and we set y
1 = y. Notice
that f(yi) = a for i = 2, ..., k, since
• f(y1) = a, and
• if f(yi) = a, but f(yi+1) 6= a for some i ∈ {1, ..., k − 1}, then f is MNP by
individual i+ 1 at yi ∈ XN via y′i+1.
In particular, f(yk) = a. Finally, start with yk ∈ XN and for k + 1 ≤ j ≤ N
change its j′th coordinate as y′j = (c ≻ ... ≻ a), one at a time. Let y
j ∈ XN be the
resulting profile after yk+1, ..., yj are changed. Then, f(y
j) = a for j = k+1, ..., N ,
since
• f(yk) = a,
• f(yj) ∈ {a, c} for all j ∈ {k + 1, ..., N} by Lemma 3.1, and
• if f(yj) = a, but f(yj+1) 6= a for some j ∈ {k, ..., N − 1}, then f(yj+1) = c,
and f is MNP by individual j + 1 at yj ∈ XN via y′j+1.
Thus, f(yN ) = a, and a ∈ A is ranked as the top by individual 1, and as the bottom
by everybody else. Then Lemma 3.2 implies that {1} is decisive. 
By UNM we know that I is decisive. Then, repeated application of Lemma 3.3
gives the result in Theorem 2.1.
4. Final Remarks
Let us make a few comparisons. Lemma 3.2 and 3.3 are counterparts of the field
extension and group contraction lemmas in [10], but with a small difference. Lemma
3.2 states that if a group is decisive over an alternative at a particular profile, then
it is globally decisive, whereas Sen’s field extension lemma is not profile specific.
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Another difference between our proof and Sen’s proof is Lemma 3.1, which is a non
trivial result that the former needs.
The former difference can be attributed to the fact that the key axiom in Theorem
2.1, strategy proofness, is a local (intra-profile) condition, while as already noted
in [4] most of the other key axioms such as monotonicity and Arrow’s IIA are more
global (inter-profile). The latter difference can be explained by different set ups
used in stating impossibility results, i.e. social welfare function vs. social choice
function. However, one can remove these differences by
• Removing Lemma 3.1 and incorporating it in the proofs of the other lemmas
wherever it is needed, and
• Replacing Lemma 3.2 with the following weaker statement, proof of which
is already embedded in the proof of Lemma 3.2: If a group is decisive over
a ∈ A, then it is decisive.
Such a change will make the two proofs parallel, but each of the resulting lemmas
would have a longer proof.
Since the differences are syntactical and can be removed, we believe that the
above proof is very close to Sen’s proof. Moreover, it is one of the shortest among
the existing proofs of Theorem 2.1, and it being missing is a surprise. One possible
cause of this delay is the emergence of other approaches; in particular, the popular
pivotal voter approach (see Sect. 1). On the other hand, [7], [16] and [17] apply
variants of this approach to prove Theorem 2.1. But the former two proofs use the
Muller-Satterthwaite theorem (see Chap. 10.1 in [7], Chap. 7.5 in [16]), while the
latter proof consists of seven lemmas, one of which is stated without a proof (see
Chap. 5.5 in [17]). As such, the current proof is more direct than any of these, and
could well be ‘the missing proof’ for an advocate of this approach.
Acknowledgements: I am thankful to Mitsuyo Shirakawa for the guidance and
to an anonymous referee for the remarks.
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